Background
During the late 1990's, the University of Idaho developed a plan to address changing student expectations for academic programs, and create opportunities "social, physical, technology and career building" on campus. Fueled in part by an expanding Idaho economy, and by the leadership of then president Robert Hoover, five major new buildings were designed and built between 1997 and 2005 to help meet those needs. The total cost of these buildings was on the order of $96 million, providing in excess of 398,000 square feet of new and 85,000 square feet of wholly remodeled space on the Moscow campus.

I took up my position as assistant professor of architecture in 2001 at the height of this building boom. My focus areas are building construction, technical integration and design, so it was great opportunity for me to develop on-campus teaching resources. In particular, I took the opportunity to serve on the faculty advisory committee for the Teaching Learning Center, attend construction meetings between November 2003 and May 2005, and document construction of entire TLC project. As a result, I became acquainted with many of the project "players" was able to use these experiences as a springboard for this case study.

According to architects and contractors who provide services to the University of Idaho, the UI has an experienced and highly skilled architectural and project management staff. They are recognized as an organization able to work with building professionals to optimize the design and construction process while getting "110 percent of the value for every construction dollar spent". This stands in stark contrast to many other state agencies. (Fullerton)

The business and political environment in the State of Idaho has historically been one that spurned licensure and other controls over work performed by contractors. However, in 1998, the Idaho legislature passed the Public Works Construction Management Licensing Act. This legislation was developed "In order to protect the public welfare and to promote the highest degree of professional conduct on the part of persons providing construction management services, . . . and provide for the licensure of individuals and regulation of persons providing construction management services for public works projects." (Idaho Code, Title 54, Chapter 45, p. 26) The motivation for this legislation was to protect small, inexperienced agencies and communities that funded projects with public moneys, from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous or inept contractors.

The UI facilities staff knew that the conventional Design-Bid-Build process, where the low bidder wins the entire contract, was not the best contracting method for achieving the high quality and high value projects expected by the university community. Because the state law was new, and regulations untested, they tried to find the best way to implement the new projects within the regulations of the new law and at the same time avoid the pitfalls of D-B-B. This resulted in testing the Construction Manager / At Risk (CM/AR) and the Construction Manager / Agent (CM/Agent) on two related projects.

The Question
From the architect's point of view, we are concerned about achieving a high quality completed project that accomplishes the original design intentions, comes in on time and on budget, and results in a satisfied client. One key question for the architect, then, is which delivery system will work best to achieve their design goals. To be more specific, which system best supports design and construction decision-making that will optimize the architectural outcome. This is a question that includes so many variables, that it is very difficult to quantify or rationalize, let along draw comparisons. Two of the five recent projects at UI, however, had a number of players in common making it somewhat easier to control key variables and make a reasonable (though not truly "scientific") comparison between delivery system types.

The UI Commons and the Teaching and Learning Center (TLC) had the following variables in common:
• The University of Idaho was the client
• The projects were funded by the State of Idaho
• Architects Yost Grube Hall/OPSIS, Design-West and Gordon Walker were on both design teams,
• Hoffman Construction Company built the projects.

One of the major differences between these projects, one that impacted both project design and construction, was the difference in the contractual relationship between the players. The focus of this case study is therefore how the contractual relationship between team members affected decision-making during design and construction, and how that may have impacted the outcome of the project in terms of achieving design intentions.

Design Intent
The schematic design concepts for the Commons and TLC were developed simultaneously in 1997. The idea was that the two buildings would be physically and programmatically linked. The design goal for the UI Commons was to create an academic and social center that provided a range of opportunities for students and faculty to "engage in informal learning long after regular class times ended" and to "allow students, faculty and staff greater access to key university programs and services without having to leave . . . the heart of campus."

The Teaching Learning Center (TLC) was a whole-building remodel of the 1960's era University Classroom Center (UCC). The goal was to provide technology-rich learning environments, and to house academic support services. [Insert CS_05_01 - Key Image of Project]

One key design issue was to conform to campus master planning guidelines. These specified that new buildings would include a predominantly brick fa�ade and incorporate other clues from the historic campus buildings.

Many of the early design decisions were guided by the client's requirement to preserve the underlying structure of the University Classroom Center as the basis of the TLC. The structural framework of the UCC - which appeared from the exterior to be highly rational structure - was actually anything but. It combined concrete and masonry load-bearing construction with a steel frame and was designed around a split - level system that stepped down a sloping site. Since the buildings were to be connected, this created many organizational challenges in the new building and determined many circulation and sectional relationships.

The Players, Team Formations & Project Descriptions
The UI Commons was the first building to be developed. It teamed Yost Grube Hall as lead architect with the local architecture firm Design West as subcontractor. Gordon Walker Architect contracted with UI as consultant for Campus Planning and Design. The architects worked with representatives of UI staff, faculty and students to develop and refine the program needs. Records show that the budget started out at about $12 million and ended up at about $19 million. [CS_05_ 4 - North fa�ade UI Commons]

Hoffman Construction Corporation (HCC) was hired by UI as Construction Manager at Risk and joined the team during design development. HCC promotes itself based on providing a good value for services rendered, its ability to communicate clearly with all project stakeholders, keep projects on track and meet deadlines. For them, "success is to deliver the project safely, on budget, on time and with a high quality of finishes." (Lawrence)

As CM/AR, Hoffman provided pre-construction services and developed a guaranteed maximum price. They then hired the subcontractors directly (on the basis of competitive bids) and were able to exert direct control over their performance. In this project delivery system, each of the three major players (owner-client, architect, CM) had a financial stake in the outcome. Decision-makers and the decision-making process were clearly defined by the contracts, making for a tight, efficient process. The project was completed in 2001. [Insert CS_05_3 - Image of Commons Team Structure]

The UI Commons was completed in 2001, and the plan was to begin construction immediately on the TLC. Due to a declining state economy and budgetary problems at UI, the project was delayed for several years. When it was revived in 2003, Design West was hired as the lead architect with OPSIS Architects and Gordon Walker as design consultant (OPSIS was formed by the two architects who were project leads for YGH on the UI Commons). There were no budget increases to account for the rising cost of construction and programmatic adjustments resulting from changing university priorities and advances in educational technology. In addition, the state mandated that design fees were lower on the TLC than on the Commons project.

During the interim, the State Department of Public Works (DPW) had determined (based on a past experience with CM/AR elsewhere in the state) that CM/AR was no longer an acceptable contractual arrangement. Hoffman Construction Corporation, again hired as a result of a competitive process, and joined the project as CM / Agent. On this project Hoffman was under contract directly with the State of Idaho Department of Public Works. The delivery system required that the state (rather than Hoffman) held 21 prime contracts directly with the "sub-contractors" and Hoffman's role was administrative and day-to-day management of fieldwork. [Insert CS_05_5 - Image of TLC Team Structure]

There was no contractual financial incentive for the construction manager to perform at a high level, although Hoffman did so due to their interest maintaining their reputation and performing work in the future. The decision-making process also involved one more layer of bureaucracy than on the Commons project. Furthermore, to help reduce costs and human resources, the system was set up so the UI architect project manager also served as the DPW project manager. This required that a key decision maker wear "two hats." Every day he had to represent two different agencies that were often at odds with each other about how to spend money. [Insert CS_05_ 6 - Image of TLC]

Lessons Learned
The academic in me says it is impossible to determine whether design intentions have been realized on each of the three projects without conducting exhaustive levels of research involving a large sample of users and stakeholders (something like a dissertation, perhaps). Because stuffy academic presentations were discouraged for this conference, I came up with a more limited list of criteria for making these judgments. The primary source of information is based on the opinions of client representatives and project architects, my personal experience and observations, and informal conversations with users.

From a design standpoint, the Commons excels in its response to the corner site in the center of campus, the good use of natural light to help organize public spaces, the comfortable and functional meeting rooms, and the detailing. It is a popular and busy facility that is flexible enough to meet the wide range of user needs. Many of the design intentions for the TLC involve the relationship with the Commons, and it appears it will succeed in providing a relatively seamless connection between the two parts. Client and architects stated they believe that the design intentions were well met for the Commons, and client representatives indicated that most of the design intentions should be met when the TLC is completed.

From the point of view of the team members interviewed for this case study, the major difference between projects is that the Commons project ran much more smoothly that the TLC. This is a factor that, though not as tangible as a glaring flaw in design or implementation might be, certainly influences the success for a given project. We can evaluate those differences in several ways: by examining the records of design and construction meetings and by looking at project close-out.

The CM/Agent system as described earlier, added layer of bureaucracy to the TLC project (the Department of Public Works as Owner) that did not exist in the Commons. By examining minutes of the construction meetings it becomes obvious that there are several items that went for months without resolution. Notes indicate that this was due to the complexities of the decision-making process. By the time the issue was resolved, it was difficult to understand the logic behind the decision. Issues of this kind take a substantial amount of administrative time for all parties involved can create impacts on scheduling and performance. Although it does not appear that it has resulted in significant problems in this project, the delivery system creates the potential to result in major problems.

Another obstacle was the fact that the construction manager did not directly control the 'purse strings' of sub-contractors. This eliminated a key point of leverage held by the CM/AR and made it more difficult to get work completed on time and corrections made in a timely fashion. This appears to have led a substantially higher number of punch list items during project close-out for the TLC than on the Commons.

Because the CM is not allowed to self-perform work, it was often difficult to accomplish minor tasks (jobsite clean-up, for instance) that could otherwise be completed more efficiently and effectively. It also eliminated the possibility for the CM to hold contracts for which they may have been able to perform work at a lower cost to the project.

The reason the CM/Agent worked as well as it did on the Teaching Learning Center is because client, architect and construction manager had worked together successfully before. This enabled the team to enter the project with a well-established level of trust and ability to communicate. It also allowed them to predict potential issues and come up with strategies in advance to avoid problems.

Finally, it does not appear that the difference in delivery methods for the Commons and TLC substantially impacted the final outcome of these two projects, although this won't be fully understood until the TLC is completed. However, The CM/Agent does pose the potential problems when used under less ideal circumstances.